American Agriculture, a modern wonder of the world, is still in trouble. During a century of scientific and technological advancement, it has attained so high a level of proficiency that it continues, on a diminishing acreage and with a decreasing number of farmers, to produce far in excess of the increasing demand of a rapidly expanding national population. Despite all efforts to curtail this abundance, production remains aloft, farmers' income shrinks, and the government goes on purchasing and storing surpluses against a time when by some means they may be disposed of somewhere. So a cry persists throughout this blessed land calling for somebody to do something to "put right" the greatest agriculture in a world not yet well fed.

To that cry, as always, America is responsive. As always, there is the prospect of additional legislation, the formulation of further policies, the promulgation of new rules and regulations, and the prosecution of such programs as afford
promise of betterment of agriculture and rural living, consistent with the general welfare. Such ready response to the farm problem, in whatever form it has arisen, has helped to make American agriculture great. It has also contributed enormously to the weight of the farm problem now bending America's back.

The shape and magnitude of America's farm problem has varied with the circumstances confronting successive generations of farmers. It has not always commanded the intensity of interest reached during the last 40 years; nor has the focus of that interest played so directly as now on the economic aspects of the problem. Formerly, public interest lay chiefly in the expansion of agriculture and its adjustment to recurring technological change. In recent years, primary interest has revolved around price-cost relationships, acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and other facets of intricate procedures aimed at the attainment of parity.

The shifts of public interest pursuant to problem changes have resulted in successive legislative actions and policy determinations which have tended to be cumulative. So in today's farm problem we discern a combined effect of several policies, each rooted in relevant legislation, which are of great importance to our agriculture but which are not clearly aligned to common objectives.

This situation, since it complicates our farm problem, invites mature consideration and frank expression of honest opinion. It is serious enough even if it could be looked upon as of domestic concern only; but it is of much wider concern. It has an impact on our relations with other countries on either side of the Iron Curtain.

Some of our policies are regarded favorably by other nations, e.g., those we have observed consistently in promot-
ing agricultural education, research and extension, and various regulatory, economic, and statistical services. These are being emulated widely in the world; indeed, their adaptation in many different governmental structures is being largely financed by the United States under contracts negotiated with land-grant colleges or universities in cooperation with recipient countries.

Other of our policies, on the other hand, are regarded unfavorably even by some friendly nations. This is true particularly with respect to policies aimed at surplus control or disposal. By those nations which also hold surpluses, our huge stocks are viewed as a constant threat to international trade in the commodities involved. These nations are less fearful of straight-forward competition in the trade channels than they are of the subsidies by which America may underwrite her "competitive" transactions.

Deficit countries, able to buy in the channels of trade, understandably are alert to the advantages of a buyers' market, and they are not disposed to discourage competition among nations holding surpluses. When a deficit country takes advantage of a buyers' market the international repercussions sometimes are pronounced, as I learned in late 1954 in the Far East. Rice-holding countries, such as Burma, were complaining that the United States had invaded the Japanese market. Actually Japan explained that she had bought where she could get the kind of rice she wanted at the price she could afford to pay. But that plausible explanation failed to allay resentment at our alleged invasion.

Nations not holding surpluses and not able to shop with dollars, even in a buyers' market, welcome with some reservation the provisions of our Public Law 480. This law permits nations qualifying under its provisions, to buy our sur-
pluses with their own currencies, the amount paid us to be held as a "counter-part fund" for use in furthering our programs within the respective countries. By this method it would seem that America gets rid of surpluses and at the same time advances its programs, but it is not quite that simple. To me it appears as a transaction comparable to one in which I get merchandise "free" for coupons or trading stamps for which in some mysterious manner I have already spent money. Similarly, the American taxpayer, having bought the surplus commodities, trades them for less valuable counter-part funds which, like the coupons and stamps, can be "redeemed" only at specified counters, in this case the countries of origin. Having had to deal in about 40 different currencies, I naturally wonder about the ways in which counter-part funds are expended and about how much better off anybody is after they are spent. But, I believe that Public Law 480 is sufficiently meritorious to warrant attempts to extend its application.

Countries unable to purchase our commodities with even their own poor currencies are willing to accept gratis allotments. Some will accept such allotments under almost any condition America wishes to impose, whereas others are reluctant if acceptance involves binding obligations to the United States in either cold or hot war. And there is always the question of who pays the freight. Free goods are not useful if you cannot afford to transport them to points of consumption.

The consensus of comments I have heard in my travels generally favors the United States as a nation making a sincere effort to do a tough job well. I have noted also the more extreme reactions, varying all the way from complete
acceptance of anything America has done to outright damnation of everything she has done.

Most nations, regardless of whether they are selling, buying, or just receiving agricultural commodities, see the conflict in our policies — to increase productivity at home and abroad, on the one hand, and to restrict production at home on the other.

There is reason to feel that the net effect of that conflict is to confuse ourselves, baffle our friends, lay ourselves open to the subleties of unfriendly nations, and leave the in-between nations bewildered.

America therefore must face up to a stern fact: Her magnificent agriculture is not “right” either at home or abroad. So she is obliged to continue her quest for a remedy to satisfy that incessant cry, although she knows by sad and costly experience that a remedy is neither easily prescribed nor readily fulfilled.

In her further quest for a remedy, America would do well, I believe, if she would take a hard look at all of her agricultural policies as they have come down through the years, not only those directed at surpluses. Surplus policies continue in the limelight and are likely to occupy it for some time yet; but actually they have not had, are not having, and are not apt to have any more profound effect on American agriculture or in reference to our foreign relations than other policies which have been observed by this country for 100 years or more.

Even a cursory examination would show our policies to be as varied as they are numerous. They are also complex. Their objectives generally are sound. But they lack the cohesion that would maximize effectiveness and minimize con-
fusion. They lack also clarity of over-all purpose, which needs to be made plain if we are to have better understanding of what, really, we are attempting to do, and if we would extend that understanding to other nations. Finally, our agricultural policies need to be seen more plainly in relation to our diplomatic, military, and commercial policies which, under the stress of international events, often command consideration not always inclusive of our agricultural goals and commitments.

To keep her agriculture in the sound position that is essential to strength in her national economy, America's review of her policies needs to be realistic and tough—but amenable, at the same time, to compromise. For, as is so often the case in human affairs, the most earnest endeavor ends somewhere between the practical and the ideal, between principle and expediency. No other end would seem probable to a man who has spent as many years as I have in the atmosphere of bureaucracy.

During an appearance I once made before an appropriation committee of the United States Senate, I was in the exceptionally rare position of a bureaucrat seeking not more but actually less money. The Bureau of the Budget had welcomed my recommended reduction and the House committee had not said it was opposed; so I was a bit confident of achievement as I faced the Senate committee. But that confidence faded fast when a member condemned my recommendation as not acceptable to his constituency. My explanation that the proposed reduction would be applied in several states, not his alone, only created further trouble for me. Finally, after having gone off the record for an extended discussion, the chairman simply and clearly summarized the outcome. "This committee," he said to me, "is in full accord
with your argument, which makes sense, but it's poor politics." The wisdom of that conclusion was underscored a few days later by a stack of telegrams representing the adverse attitude of every community in the United States that could have been in any way affected by my proposed saving. Needless to say, the appropriation act ignored my recommendation, and I was obliged to continue to operate facilities which in my judgment had outlived their usefulness.

My career has afforded me the privilege of serving under several different secretaries of agriculture, not all of the same political faith. I have seen each of them come to his office, seemingly determined to take the kinks out of agriculture and put it "right." Certainly his party had pledged itself to do just that, and he had been chosen to carry out the party's promises. Insofar as my association with each secretary permits me to judge, I should say that each in his turn did about everything that anyone in that man-killing job could have done.

In his struggle to console the forces in front of him—the Congress, farm organizations, various commodity, breed, and industrial associations, consumers and other groups—he had to depend in very large measure upon the forces back of him—the career employees, the bureaucrats if you prefer, or the public servants if you would be gracious. These backstop forces persisted in laying before him facts for which there could be no substitute. No secretary has escaped them. I suspect that each has been impressed by the volume of fact at his disposal and by its unending flow toward him. He must have seen in those data also much of what had been seen by his predecessors; it could not be otherwise, for facts do not change as they accrue. Yet each secretary, in his hour of decision, has had to take into account not only the
facts before him but the politics of the moment, or risk being sunk — on the Hill or in the Hustling.

Alone in the same spot, I think any one of us would have concluded that until sounder bases are provided as guides to further legislation, policies, and programs, proposed remedies for the ills of agriculture are likely to be imbalanced concoctions of fact, opinion, and expediency. I would expect them to achieve the same end as my ill-fated recommendation for a budget reduction. They might make sense but still not make the grade in politics.

Ever sounder bases are in the making and in time will serve to guide more wisely our economic, social, and political adjustment to technological progress. But we have not yet acquired the bases needed, and our lack should be in mind as we look over our policies.

That look, moreover, must see not only the policies of primary concern domestically; it must see also our policies affecting foreign relations. Both types and their interplay have helped to bring American agriculture to its present position. So, in seeking realistic ways in which to strengthen that position at home, it would be unwise to omit consideration of the high ideals inspired by America in a frightened world as she progressively assumed, or had thrust upon her, steadily increasing responsibilities in international leadership: the earth-girdling declaration of the Four Freedoms, for example; America's daring initiative in bringing about before the end of World War II concerted effort among the then United Nations to preserve and magnify the lofty ideals of democracy; and then America's "bold, new" program of technical cooperation and economic development aimed at mutual security.

But even if we train our camera upon policies reasonably
within our range of vision, to get a true picture we need a variety of specially ground lenses capable, first, of encompassing in a single exposure the whole depth and breadth of our history and, second, of portraying against that background the heritage, the body, and the soul of this living, changing, organic something which we call agriculture. Then its ailment would become more apparent, diagnosis could be more exact, and a remedy more certain.

Lacking such equipment, we are obliged, as it were, to resort to a series of aerial photographs, the assembly and interpretation of which, I assure you, is not to be accomplished within the fast-expiring limit of my allotted time. The best I can do is to point to some which I believe to be worthy of inclusion in more comprehensive studies.

I would point to the existence in this hemisphere of ancient cultures whose influence on our agriculture has been infinitely greater than is commonly recognized. They gave us corn, for example, and potatoes and tobacco; and their farming practices and irrigation structures have conditioned our own. I would point, too, to some stakes driven during our colonial era, which set the course of national development and projected our agricultural expansion. Then came events which gave us independence and launched on an orbit encircling the globe the basic concepts of democracy.

Very soon thereafter, occupying a domain continental in scope, America in her youth possessed unmatched natural resources with potentialities beyond her imagination. To exploit those resources she encouraged immigration and opened her ports to people of many different origins, of varied skills, but with a common goal—realization of the opportunities and the freedom our democracy held out to
them. With those people came seed, and plants, and live-
stock, and farm practices, and the "know how" which
enabled some of them to settle wild land and tame it. Others
of them turned to the development of industry, the ex-
tension of transportation lines, the improvement of means
of communication, the foundation of towns and cities,
the substructure of commerce. They with their successors
constitute the warp and the woof of the fabric from which
has been cut the agricultural-industrial pattern of America.
But our progress was not accomplished, certainly not in the
beginning, without the financial assistance of some of our
mother countries or of private investors within those
countries who were convinced of our future.

I would point to early agricultural societies in which
through open discussion the multiplying difficulties en-
countered by farmers were delineated and, where necessary,
drawn to the attention of governing authorities. Most au-
thorities in those days lived in the states and territories in-
stead of the national capital. Several states, including Iowa,
were in fact leading the federal government in wrestling with
the farm problem of a century ago. At that time it entailed
a rising need for a type of education better suited to the
requirement of farmers and workers in industry than the
classical type conventionally available only to the learned
professions.

National policies based on Congressional acts of 1862
invite special consideration. The Land-Grant Act, gestating
in the minds of thoughtful men for a generation before
legislation gave it life, set in motion an educational policy,
later fortified and extended by supplemental acts, which
has remained at the heart of agricultural advancement in
this country. By an enabling act, Congress in 1862 also
created the United States Department of Agriculture, thus raising agriculture to cabinet rank and setting in motion activities which, largely in cooperation with the states and territories, have contributed to the enormity of agricultural production. The Homestead Act, designed to encourage land settlement and home ownership, impelled production and provided an operational base for progressively increasing production consistent with advancing technology.

Accompanying the development of the land-grant institutions and the federal department was the growth of state and territorial departments or commissions of agriculture. From the activities of all of these agencies has come a state-federal program of agricultural education, research, and regulation that is acclaimed in many other countries. This is not a national program in the sense of being planned and directed by a central authority. Rather it is a cooperative, nation-wide program of farm and home services to every community—services taken largely for granted in America but sadly lacking in many other countries.

Farmer organizations, carrying torches lit by the older agricultural societies and torches which they themselves have lit, have kept alert to expanding knowledge and advancing technology, pushed for adoption of constructive policies where pushing was necessary, and applied brakes when action threatened to out-run wisdom. The farmer organizations are perhaps no closer together than our armed forces in the Pentagon, but the force of their joint action when they rally to a common cause is a force to be respected, as it has been on a good many occasions.

Segments of industry have become ever more important components of agriculture as it has outgrown the confines of the farm fence. These segments are the bases of supplies
of farm machinery, fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, biologics, and transportation and communication services. It would be impossible even to approximate the role of these and other segments of industry in making possible the attainment of the high level of productivity now characterizing American agriculture. We can hope that industry may be equally effective in meeting the difficulties of distribution.

While looking at industry's role in agriculture, I would not overlook Main Street with its commercial institutions, its banks, its professional services, its gas stations, and its appliance centers. Here is the farmer's primary market and, we should not forget, the place where he joins the ranks of ultimate consumers. Here he receives his money, and here he spends it. Along Main Street is to be found, also, a powerful lobby which has had a voice in many an action defining policies affecting agriculture. I am inclined to feel that the voice of Main Street will help to determine the life and level of future support prices.

I would call attention to our long-established policy of exploring the world for seeds and plants of promise in this country. In consequence of what Americans did before Columbus arrived, and of what they have done since, it is reasonable to believe that three-fourths of our principal crops, virtually all of our breeds of livestock, and many of the techniques we employ in agriculture have origins beyond the borders of the United States. Production of each of the crops now in surplus in this country has been greatly advanced by the materials and techniques we have sought, introduced, and established. The same can be said of other crops not in surplus, as the soybean and forage crops found
commonly in our grasslands, which are important to the livestock industries, including dairying, whose products are in surplus.

The policies toward which I have thus far directed attention are among our older policies. Prior to 1912 they were just about the only policies we had. Yet they were contributing steadily to an improving husbandry by an intelligent, literate farm population.

In the relative calm which had pervaded the farm atmosphere up to that time, Iowa's "Tama Jim" Wilson had served comfortably as Secretary of Agriculture for 12 consecutive years. He was my first Secretary. I recall my first glimpse of him:

It was exactly noon of a mild day in mid-October, 1910. Both hands on the clock in the tower of the old post office building were straight up. A polished open carriage stood before the old, red administration building. Two well-groomed horses, in equally well-groomed harnesses, were restive but still responsive to the clucking of a liveried driver who sat erect, eyes forward. Then, as if by unvarying custom, Secretary "Tama Jim" appeared. He wore a Prince Albert and a high hat which made his white beard the more conspicuous. He traversed the terrace between the front door and the waiting carriage. He stepped into the carriage and sat alone. The driver spoke gently to the horses, and the Secretary was on his way to lunch.

Those were the horse-and-buggy days of the Department, attuned to the tempo of the times. But that tempo, as we have since learned the hard way, was as the calm before a storm.

The true origin of the storm by which American agriculture has been beset since those peaceful days may never be known. It probably arose, like hurricane Hazel and her sisters, at some distant point and then moved in upon us. With no storm-warning service at that time, we were left
to sense the approaching storm only when a presidential election swept into the White House a valiant advocate of "The New Freedom."

With some friends, I had been privileged to visit the governor in his office in Trenton when he was still only mentioned as a possible candidate in the forthcoming election. He asked us questions about the Far West, with which we were familiar, but he did not do us the honor of telling us anything about the type of man he would name as secretary of agriculture in the event that the champion of "The New Freedom" should eventually be elected.

The man he later named Secretary had a strong bent for economics, and it wasn't long before the old Department had a "new look." We soon had the beginnings of a Bureau of Agricultural Economics; agricultural extension services began nation-wide performance; farmer cooperatives took on new life; statistical and economic services were enhanced. "The New Freedom" had sponsored the debut of Miss Social Science and made plain the intention of making her the life partner of Mr. Natural Science who, until then, had lived in blissful bachelorhood. And it was at that time, according to some of my old colleagues, that the storm broke. Since then, they claim, the farm problem has been constantly in America's economic, social, and political laps — first in one, then in another, and sometimes in all three at the same time.

The new look of the federal department was reflected also in the countenances of all associated agencies, institutions, and societies, including the land-grant colleges and universities. But we had scarcely become accustomed to it before the rumblings of World War I prompted defense measures which threw the reconstructed administrative
machinery into high gear, and we were soon in an accelerated program of production. The economics of agriculture were submerged in war measures when at last America took her place as a combatant, and her farmers were called upon further to increase production despite the drain on manpower made by the armed forces.

American agriculture's success during that war was more than an important aid to victory; it demonstrated its peacetime potential. That could have warned us of impending trouble, but we were happy with the Armistice and the prospect of making the world safe for democracy through the still a-borning League of Nations. That prospect foun­dered tragically when the United States, in its first real test of world leadership for peace, refused to ratify the Charter to which Wilson had pinned his faith in our future.

The technical knock-out America dealt the League was not without its effect on the home folks who still yearned for the tranquility they had fought to achieve; and this country was not prepared for the plight in which agriculture was enmeshed within three years after the Armistice. Government responded, nevertheless, and there was a scramble to provide legislation and define policies again to "put right" the agriculture which so recently had demon­strated its might.

Those unhappy days presaged the lagging but inevitable financial crumple of the 1930's which ushered in the hopeful New Deal. Its unprecedented remedial measures Con­gress promptly endorsed, and served notice on a watchful world of the length to which America was prepared to go on behalf of its agriculture.

Despite all measures adopted and earnestly prosecuted in those turbulent years, however, America still had her
farm problem. Efforts to hold farm supply in line with market demand, even the more drastic efforts, were in large part futile. The momentum of technology continued unabated, and mechanization extended. The productivity of agriculture was steadily enhanced and reached heights to be exceeded only by the all-out effort later demanded by World War II. Those record years of production magnified anew the impending hassle with distribution which could have been acute about the time America dropped her atom bombs. But it was postponed because of war in Korea. Then we got into the middle of the delayed hassle and have been in it ever since.

The farm problem as we face it today is complicated by much more than the astounding productivity of American agriculture. For during World War II America had become magnanimous toward her allies. She opened wide her windows and doors and invited them to help themselves to just about everything we had to offer. Some of us occupying responsible positions wondered, at the time, how far we should go in upholding that policy. I remember that I was given indefinite instructions to be circumspect but not to oppose entrance to our laboratories by any of our then allies.

To what extent America at that time contributed to science in the Soviet Republics as we have now come to recognize it, I would not presume to say. But I believe we then disclosed to the world an agriculture geared to science and advancing technology which commanded respect as well as interest. We stimulated the hope and ambition of other nations, and held out to the people of nations still to be born the prospect of their becoming able to make fuller
and more intelligent use of their resources, as they hoped might soon be their war-won right.

The hope thus aroused was given a still greater boost in 1943, while the war was still hot, by America's sponsorship of the first world conference on food and agriculture. The final report of that conference shows America leading 37 other nations—the United Nations, in fact—into a battle against hunger and want, dedicated to the cause of satisfying the nutritional requirements and raising the level of living of all people.

That battle is still on. Membership of the Food and Agricultural Organization has increased to 74 nations, more than a score of which have come into existence since World War II. Each nation has a single vote, its official delegate usually is the secretary or minister of agriculture, or his designee, and each delegate usually takes with him to FAO conferences a delegation, varying in size from one to a score or more members. The United States' delegation usually is among the largest and includes, besides technical advisers in agriculture, economics, fisheries, forestry, and nutrition, representatives of the State Department, the Congress, and the farm organizations. Americans are to be seen also among several of the numerous nongovernmental bodies ranged in seats reserved for official observers.

Through its delegation at conferences and its representation on the Council and standing advisory committees, the United States has been an active participant in the formulation and review of FAO's program, fiscal policies, and administrative procedures. She currently bears a third of the cost of the organization's regular program, which is at the percentage level she has sought to achieve and seeks
to maintain in her support of the specialized agencies and of
the United Nations Organization itself. The United States
bears an even larger percentage of the United Nations Fund
for Technical Assistance, from which FAO receives an
allotment about equal to the amount voted by the Confer-
ence.

Not content to be a participant in the international pro-
grams initiated by the New Deal, the United States early in
the Fair Deal launched a "bold, new program" of its own.
This program, by contributing to the UN Technical Assis-
tance Fund, to that extent strengthened the international
programs; but, basically, it is a bilateral program between
the United States and individual friendly countries—part
of a broader United States program of economic develop-
ment and mutual security.

Other nations have borne their pro rata share of the
costs of the international agencies; some, such as the Com-
monwealth nations, have also continued additional pro-
grams, as under the Colombo Plan; and others have bilateral
programs. In the meantime, the Soviet Republics and some
satellites have entered the world picture with programs of
their own to supplement what they are supporting through
the United Nations. The most recent arrival in the arena
is Israel.

Still older programs than any supported by public funds
have been continued by religious and philanthropic organ-
izations; and great foundations have now extended their
activities to widely separated parts of the world.

In this total global movement, policies of the United
States, to be most effective, must take account of policies
adopted by other countries and by various agencies dedi-
cated to the achievement of common goals through inter-
national cooperation. That all effort directed at common goals should be coordinated internationally as well as nationally and locally is taken for granted; and I believe efforts at coordination are made just as seriously at the international level as at any other and with as much effect. One of the heavy costs of democracy, at home and abroad, pertains to coordination or the lack of it. But the cost of it is still trivial compared to that paid where freedom and individual initiative are lacking.

The two-world concept, which unfortunately now permeates most human affairs, has created rivalry in the field of technical assistance and economic development as much as in the field of missiles and space ships. And recipient nations, finding themselves between the two great forces in that rivalry, either are afraid to favor one side over the other, or they coyly play both sides against the middle.

This is a situation of which neither side in the cold war can be proud and about which no in-between nation can be happy. The dire consequence of its continuance could be a retreat from the high plane of cooperation for mutual benefit back to the plane of national isolation. And hundreds of millions of people would accept almost any other alternative.

Hence the United States, having gone as far as it has in initiating and espousing programs aimed at agricultural betterment in the world as well as at home, has a vital decision to make: Whether to continue on or turn back. She cannot “just stand there.”

If America needs a multi-lens camera to provide a picture of how her agriculture got where it is, she needs perhaps still more elaborate and efficient equipment to point the way ahead. She does not have such equipment,
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and is not likely to have it, so she must reach her decision by human means, taking due account of recognizable alternatives.

She could withdraw from the international scene of which agriculture comprises so large a part. But her withdrawal could not be graceful, nor to her own advantage. She would disappoint her strongest allies, shatter the hope of many another friendly nation, and surrender to a rival world the leadership she has maintained, no matter how tenuously, for more than a decade. She would deny to her agriculture at home not only the potential of wider world-markets, but the privilege of sharing her abundance to help insure better health and well-being among all people. The possibility of this country's taking a decision to withdraw, therefore, is beyond my range of vision.

Conversely, she can continue to lead the free world toward agricultural betterment and, by her example, perhaps exert a similar influence on the rest of the world. This decision, which I favor, would be to her credit among all nations and to her advantage at home. But it must denote a position of positive, friendly cooperation, make clear its high purpose, and make plain a determination to align all policies in support of that purpose.

I would favor also more positive leadership by the United States in exploring with other nations every possible means of accomplishing better distribution of the products of an advancing agriculture. Such exploration, I would hope, could be undertaken by nations not merely as traders holding or seeking stocks and disposed only to dicker for advantage, but as responsible sovereignties seeking, among themselves and on behalf of others not represented at the council table, the kind of peace and well-being which, I
venture to believe, may still be found in a bag of grain, a bale of cotton, a pound of butter, or a good cigar.

* * *

America today is in a much better position than formerly to exercise positive leadership. A dozen years ago very few Americans had been off-shore, except in the armed forces, which had other purposes in mind than the improvement of agriculture. Most of our experience lay in limited foreign agricultural service. And when we moved full-scale into the foreign field we were not well prepared for the load we had confidently undertaken to carry. We had to learn by experience, sometimes painful and humiliating, the ways of people, their cultural backgrounds, their aspirations, and the extent to which and by what methods we might be helpful to them and they to us. And we had to learn that the road to happiness in association with them was not to be paved with our money, our "know how," and our vim and vigor. We had to learn that some of our best friends are not always willing to let us do what we think is best for them. We have learned those lessons, and our earlier mistakes are not likely to recur. Thousands of Americans now are prepared to pursue, far more intelligently than before, the goals which have not changed and the benefits which are still to be attained.

Our cooperation should seek mutual benefits in the basic sciences as they are being developed in the world, for they are important to the future of agriculture. Essentially the same basic sciences that are involved in current efforts to perfect missiles and satellites are fundamental in our quest for answers to unknowns still beclouding the phenomena with which agriculture is obliged to live.

I have been made conscious, by wide travel in more than
half the nations of the world, of an intangible but discernible something that seems to distinguish between governments and people. Too often, I fear, our attention is directed or drawn toward a few men who temporarily head governments rather than toward the lasting millions who are governed. Governors come and go and governments change, whereas the masses of people governed remain to continue combatting their difficulties which often have been rendered still more complex by misgovernment. Those masses continue to hope for peace and for success in the use of the natural resources upon which they must largely depend. And among those masses only are the ideals of democracy in a free world to be realized. It is there that the brotherhood of man must live if it is to live at all.

Look at Egypt, for example. What was done in 1902 and subsequently to build the existing Aswan Dam in the lower Nile and to perfect the water distribution system, benefited the Egyptian people immeasurably, without reference to whether their ruler was a Farouk or a Nasser. The success of that dam has convinced them that they need another and still higher dam upstream in order to make available similar benefits to a now much larger population. The need, I believe every informed man will agree, is urgent. But there is still much uncertainty as to whether a new dam will be built and if so when, by what means, and from what source. The rivalry between two worlds holds the development in abeyance. Similar situations are to be found in the Jordan Valley, in Kashmir, and in other places too numerous to spawn optimism.

There is great need in the world for understanding of the restiveness engendered among people upon whom such delaying actions are imposed by governing forces disposed
more to dicker than to deliver. What, those people may well inquire, is the difference between delaying actions imposed by self-government and those formerly imposed by colonialism? Being still denied the water they urgently require, what, for example, have the Egyptians gained by their revolt against Farouk except to get Nasser and a changed form of government? And if people in that position come to believe that the change has not been productive of the good they crave, then may they risk still further change? If so, is the change to be sought in the free or in the communist world?

We may well ponder a further question before leaving the Nile Valley: Who is going to pay the greater cost of the determination by Western powers to withdraw from the proposed scheme of financing the needed high dam—the people of Egypt or the people of the West? I can only venture a layman’s opinion that, in the long run, withdrawal will cost the West more in the Near East alone than the dam project would have cost to finance in toto.

It is not surprising that in Egypt and in other parts of the world where people are similarly disappointed, or for other reasons are equally dissatisfied with the continuance of surmountable barriers to progress, a voice from the masses reminds the American of what the people of his own country once did to bring about conditions conducive to greater national stature. And the thoughtful American, so reminded, has something to ponder.

His pondering leads to a sincere belief that American agriculture, still in its late teens, can attain full maturity only by accepting courageously and positively the responsibilities of the leadership America has assumed. Other nations see in our production achievements a pattern for
them to follow and in our distribution difficulties a task for them to share, if invited wholeheartedly to do so.

But, says the skeptic, if we should go on utilizing our full productive capacity and encouraging other nations to do likewise, and if we should in the next decade find better ways to distribute the increased production, where would that get us? I can only express profound faith in such a future—faith that we would be living in a better world, with a much larger percentage of a much larger population much better fed and clothed and housed.

And in the meantime? What we may do may be even more costly in dollars than what we have done for agriculture, but much less costly than what we are doing and may have to do in the race for missiles and space ships that could deny the world the peace that a prosperous agriculture could win.